#07 Bacchus reading group summary
This month’s reading: Rudolph, J. L. (2020). The lost moral purpose of science education. Science Education, 104(5), 895-906.
Notes of the comments made during the discussion:
There were several interesting dimensions to the paper, the following observations are in no particular order.
The argument that he is developing, in essence is telling a story, but it is telling a story with the use of (historical) facts of how the justification of science changed over the last century
He makes a connection that the early advocates for a moral dimension of the role of science, where inspired in term by their experiences of having studied at German universities (who presumably followed the Humboldian model).
Likewise, the also mentioned that the moral purpose of science was potentially more palpable as an argument within a backdrop of higher religiosity within society. Where the “natural philosophy”, being the forerunner of science, justified their existence in these terms
He further develops the argument, that a defence of the uniqueness of science cannot be provided based on empirical terms in a utilitarian fashion.
Not only, because past attempt where this was tried have not only failed, but subsequently further undermined science (as eventually the facts changed)
But also, because the problem of value of science is only partially an empirical problem, relating also to the trust dimension and civic virtues of a wider liberal society in general
Another line of argumentation explored within the paper, is that relativist claims about the nature of scientific truth may have had detrimental unintended consequences not intended by their original proponents.
Hence, the question may not be so much markers for absolute truth claims, but rather in that it teaches us how and what are the factors that establish trust in the first place.
In specific he states:
“Maybe the focus on teaching that reliable knowledge is something attainable and inherently good is not so much a moral argument as it is ultimately a civic one—an argument for the value of expertize in helping us live better and more humanely with one another in our modern society. In this sense one could see it as just as utilitarian or functional as all the others. But that would be a mistake. Its “functionality”—if one were to use that term—is clearly more foundational in that it underwrites all the others. (p. 903-904)
What was also noteworthy, was that according to him articulating this above mentioned purpose of science has hitherto been taken-for-granted in acknowledgement of how important it is, but not explicitly articulated in these terms.
